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Implementing a Safety Instrumented Burner Management (SI-BMS) can be challenging, costly, 
and time consuming.  Simply identifying design shortfalls/gaps can be costly, and this does not 
include costs associated with the capital project to target the gap closure effort itself.  
Additionally, when one multiplies the costs by the total number of heaters at different sites, these 
total costs can escalate quickly.  However, a “template” approach to implementing SI-BMS in a 
brownfield environment can offer a very cost effective solution for end users.  Creating standard 
“templates” for all deliverables associated with a SI-BMS will allow each subsequent SI-BMS to 
be implemented at a fraction of the cost of the first.  This is because a template approach 
minimizes rework associated with creating a new SI-BMS package. The ultimate goal is to 
standardize implementation of SI-BMS in order to reduce engineering effort, create standard 
products, and ultimately reduce cost of ownership. 
2. Safety Instrumented Burner Management System (SI-BMS) 
To clarify the issue at hand, let us first define the problem.  A Burner Management System 
(BMS) is defined per NFPA 87 2015 edition as: 
The field devices, logic system, and final control elements dedicated to combustion safety and 
operator assistance in the starting and stopping of fuel preparation and burning equipment and 
for preventing misoperation of and damage to fuel preparation and burning equipment. 
To fully understand the definition of a Safety Instrumented System per IEC 61511 2004 edition 
one needs to review several different definitions together as whole:   
 
Safety Function - function to be implemented by one or more protection layers, which is 
intended to achieve or maintain a safe state for the process, with respect to a specific hazardous 
event.  
Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) - safety function to be implemented by a safety 
instrumented system (SIS).  Note:   A SIF is designed to achieve a required safety integrity level 
(SIL) which is determined in relationship with the other protection layers participating to the 
reduction of the same risk. 
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) - discrete level (one out of four) allocated to the SIF for specifying 
the safety integrity requirements to be achieved by the SIS. SIL 4 is related to the highest level of 
safety integrity; SIL 1 is related to the lowest. 
Safety Instrumented System (SIS) - instrumented system used to implement one or more SIFs.  
Considering the aforementioned definitions, a Safety Instrumented Burner Management System 
(SI-BMS) can be defined as a Burner Management System, where the performance based risk 
reduction concepts of the Safety Lifecycle as contained in IEC 61511 have been applied to the 
fired device in addition to the prescriptive requirements mandated by the code/standard that 
governs the fired device.  Traditionally, BMSs are designed and installed per prescriptive 
codes/standards such as: 
• NFPA 85 - Boiler and Combustion Systems Hazard Code 
• NFPA 86 - Standard for Ovens and Furnaces 
• NFPA 87 - Recommended Practice for Fluid Heaters 
• API 556 - Instrumentation, Control, and Protective Systems for Gas Fired Heaters 
When one overlays the requirements of the Safety Lifecycle to a BMS design it requires one to: 
• Identify the hazardous events resulting in unacceptable consequences 
• Identify the safety functions that prevent hazardous events 
• Establish the performance criteria (e.g., the risk reduction) for these safety functions 
• Allocate safety functions to systems designed and managed to achieve the performance 
criteria 
• Document the functional and integrity requirements in a design specification 
• Verify that the design and management practices are sufficient to meet the performance 
requirements 
• Document and implement operation and maintenance procedures to support performance 
requirements 
• Manage changes to the process equipment and the safety systems to ensure safe operation 
When conducting an SIS Grandfathering exercise (initially applying the Safety Lifecycle to 
existing systems) at a brownfield site, one will typically identify missing documentation 
along with a requirement for some new field devices and/or logic solvers.  These findings 
result in the need for a capital project to upgrade the BMS to full compliance with IEC 61511 
requirements.     
 
 
3. Challenges Associated with Implementing an SI-BMS 
There are multiple tasks associated with implementing an SI-BMS.  Some of these tasks are 
mandated by IEC 61511, while the remainder are typical instrument and controls related 
deliverables and tasks required to properly design, install, and commission the upgraded SI-
BMS.  All of these tasks require time and money.  If multiple fired devices need to be upgraded, 
these costs can escalate quickly.  However, combining planning with a novel execution strategy, 
significant time and money can be saved. 
Many different unit operations require a BMS, including reboilers, indirect heaters, steam 
boilers, process heaters, thermal oxidizers, and incinerators.  There are many similarities between 
the operation, hazards, and code requirements of these various pieces of equipment.  For 
instance, all of these fired devices typically have similar logic requirements around: 
1) Pre-fire permissives 
2) Proof of Purge 
3) Light off 
4) Normal Shutdowns 
5) Post Purge 
If a templatized programmatic approach is implemented, the above similarities can be leveraged 
to save on both engineering schedule and costs.     
3.1 What are the tasks associated with a typical SI-BMS upgrade? 
For simplicity sake, let us assume the SI-BMS upgrade effort has been scoped to include the 
following: 
• Existing standalone general purpose PLCs will be replaced with new Safety PLCs 
• Existing switches will be upgraded to transmitters 
• New shutoff valves will be added only where required to meet SIL targets 
• Local light off functionality will be provided via a flat panel 
• General purpose area classification 
• NEMA 4X Panel Design 
To better understand the schedule and cost savings potentials, the tasks and deliverables required 
to complete the above simplistic scope of work will be described in more detail below.  
  
 
Safety Lifecycle Tasks  
The following is a summary of Safety Lifecycle related tasks that must be performed on each 
BMS to be upgraded.  Refer to IEC 61511 for additional information for specific details. 
• Process Hazards Analysis 
• Layer of Protection Analysis with Safety Integrity Level (SIL) Selection 
• Safety Requirements Specification with Functional Logic Definition 
• Safety Integrity Level (SIL) Verification Calculations 
• Functional Test Plans 
• Functional Safety Assessments (Stage1, 2, and 3) 
Instrumentation & Control System Design Tasks 
The following is a summary of instrumentation and control system design related tasks that must 
be performed on each BMS to be upgraded.   
• Instrument Approved Vendors List in line with SIL Calculation assumptions 
• Instrument Datasheets 
• Instrument Index 
• I/O List 
• Control Panel Design with Bill of Materials 
• Control Panel Internal Wiring 
• Field Wiring (Loops, Swing Arms, Schematics) 
• Control System Architecture Diagram 
• Instrumentation and/or Electrical Installation Details 
• Cable and Conduit Block Diagram 
• Cable Schedule 
• Software Requirements Specification 
• Logic Solver Configuration  
• Logic Solver Simulation Logic  
• Local Flat Panel Configuration  
• Historian Configuration  
• Remote BPCS HMI Configuration  
• Factory Acceptance Test Procedure/Testing 
• Site Acceptance Test Procedure/Testing 
• Commissioning Test Procedures/Testing 
  
 
Operations & Maintenance Tasks 
The following is a summary of Operations and Maintenance related tasks that must be performed 
on each BMS to be upgraded.   
• Functional Test Plans, Instrument Calibration, Valve Leak Testing loaded and scheduled 
into the site Computerized Maintenance Management System (CMMS) per Proof Test 
Coverage assumptions in SIL Calculations 
• Spare Parts in Stores per Mean Time To Repair assumptions in SIL Calculations 
• Operations and Maintenance Trained on new SI-BMS  
• Program and personnel in place to track Time in Bypass, Demand Frequency, Cause 
Frequency, Dangerous Undetected Failures, and Late/Incomplete Testing of SIFs per IEC 
61511 requirements 
4. Templatization Opportunity 
The “templatization” approach recognizes that if one can design a typical SI-BMS one time (i.e. 
a boiler) and then copy the design for each subsequent similar SI-BMS installation, (i.e. the next 
series of boilers) there is potential for significant time and cost savings.  When using a 
“templatization” approach, information that will need to change from installation to installation 
is identified with placeholder tagging, wire labels, descriptors, and panel names. These 
placeholders can then be automatically updated with the actual BMS-specific tagging, wire 
labels, panel names, from system to system.  This template encompasses as many tasks and 
deliverables as possible included in the following areas:   
• Safety Lifecycle Tasks  
• Instrumentation and Control System Design Tasks 
• Operations and Maintenance Tasks 
Note that differences will exist even within similar fired devices for a variety of reasons, for 
instance, there could be small differences between steam boiler installations.  The goal is to use 
the templatization approach where ever possible to quickly complete the design for the majority 
of similar functionality.  The smaller quantity of new or unique functionality would then be 
designed using the normal traditional engineering approach.   
4.1 Semi-Quantitative Risk Analysis 
The most critical component to being able to leverage templates from one installation to the next 
is associated with the risk analysis.  If independent teams with different facilitators are given the 
task of conducting a qualitative PHA/LOPA, one will end up with mis-defined SIFs, missing 
SIFs, and orders of magnitude of differences in SIL targets across the entire range of fired 
devices.  This is due to the qualitative nature of the risk analysis process coupled with limited 
knowledge of the team associated with BMS hazards/operation because it is often associated 
with vendor packed equipment.  These differences in analysis will result in large differences in 
instrumentation and controls scope which will result in chaos that cannot be readily consumed by 
the associated SI-BMS upgrade capital project.  To keep to the budget, it is imperative that a 
 
consistent semi-quantitative based risk analysis be conducted to drive consistency in the SIF 
definitions and SIL targets.  Consistency can be achieved as follows: 
1. Select BMS unit operation (i.e. boiler) 
2. Review all code/standard mandated protection layers (i.e. NFPA 85 mandated alarms and 
interlocks) 
3. BMS unit operation Subject Matter Expert (i.e. boiler BMS guru) develops a PHA/LOPA 
template that includes all code/standard mandated protection layers and typical causes 
4. Perform consequence modeling on typical hazards (i.e. uncontrolled combustion event for 
various chamber volumes) to provide team specific guidance on consequence selection (i.e. 
severe injury vs fatality) 
5. PHA/LOPA team would start with the PHA/LOPA template, confirm cause frequencies for 
noted causes, add installation specific causes, confirm consequence and occupancy for the 
installation, and confirm all protection layers 
The above approach will reduce team time, but, more importantly, it will ensure consistent risk 
analysis results are achieved.  Consistency is achieve because this above approach is semi-
quantitative as opposed to the traditional qualitative approach, which is subject to team member 
opinions and limitation of BMS unit operation knowledge.   
4.2 Database Driven Approach 
The key to the templatization is utilization of a database centric approach towards completion of 
project mandated deliverables / tasks.  Three major databases are required to be synchronized 
and carefully managed through the project: 
• Safety Lifecycle Management Database to execute Safety Lifecycle Tasks and 
Operations and Maintenance Tasks 
• Intelligent Engineering Drawing Database to execute Instrumentation and Control 
System Design Tasks 
• Safety PLC configuration Database to support configuration and testing of the Safety 
PLC application logic  
The Safety Lifecycle Management Database is the master data record and should have a vigorous 
internal Management of Change (MoC) schema in place to efficiently manage overall project 
data. 
Figure 1 below provides a high level overview of how the templatized work process is executed.   
The stepwise execution is described as follows: 
1. Perform a site survey to identify the total number of BMS templates required (i.e. boiler, 
reboiler, vaporizer, etc.) and note any code/standard violations. 
2. Create SI-BMS templates and standards for the typical unit operations noted in site 
survey  
3. Start new project – select which SI-BMS Standard template applies for this unit operation 
(i.e. boiler).   
 
4. Load SI-BMS standard template (i.e. boiler) into the Safety Lifecycle Management 
Database and replace alias tags with real world tag numbers and information.  Assume 
for now 80% of unit operation functionality (i.e. boiler) Safety Lifecycle Safety Lifecycle 
Tasks are addressed by the standard template. 
5. Complete Safety Lifecycle Safety Lifecycle Tasks on installation specific unique 
features.  Assume 20% new or unique functionality that is not covered in the SI-BMS 
template, will be added to project design basis. 
6. Safety Lifecycle Management Database will export tagging details, I/O tags, calibrated 
ranges, trip points, time delays, etc. to the intelligent engineering drawing package used 
for updating Instrumentation and Control System Design Tasks.  Assume for now 80% of 
unit operation functionality (i.e. boiler) Instrumentation and Control System Design 
Tasks are addressed by the standard template. 
7. Complete Instrumentation and Control System Design Tasks on installation specific 
unique features.  Assume 20% new or unique functionality that is not covered in the SI-
BMS template, will be added to project design basis. 
8. Safety Lifecycle Management Database will export Safety Requirements and Software 
Requirements to the Safety PLC configuration work station.  This would include the 
following:  I/O tags, calibrated ranges, trip points, time delays, function block/logic 
template instances, soft tags, logic definition (pre-fire, purge, pilot light off, main light 
off, normal shutdown, post purge, etc.), tags that must be passed to historian, diagnostics, 
etc. 
9. Safety PLC configuration work station will then automatically configure I/O point 
assignments and application software logic.  It is expected that 80% of the logic will be 
capable of being automatically generated.  This is simply referred to as ability to Auto 
Configure the system.   
10. Complex configuration is assumed to be 20% or less and will be configured through 
normal engineering practices. 
11. Safety PLC configuration when finalized will generate a configuration file, which will be 
sent to the Test Engine, which is a PC based controller software simulation package. 
12. Safety Lifecycle Management Database will generate a test script to be executed in the 
Test Engine to conduct exhaustive automated tests on the application logic.  This is 
simply referred to as ability to Auto Test the system. 
13. Later, once the SI-BMS has been commissioned and installed in the field, the Safety 
Lifecycle Management Database will compare current configuration against the safety 
and software requirements and test scripts.  If discrepancies are detected, it is in theory 
identifying a failure in the MoC work process, where application software changes would 
start with the requirements and testing requirements being updated in Safety Lifecycle 
Management Database as opposed to going directly to the safety PLC to make logic 









5. Cost and Schedule Savings Opportunity 
By implementing the templatization approach noted above, significant savings can be achieved 
throughout all aspects of the project as can be seen in Figure 2 below.   
Figure 2 – SI-BMS Program Savings 
 
After each template instantiation (i.e. project 1, project 2, project 3, etc.), a continuous 
improvement lessons learned session should be conducted to identify areas where future savings 
can be achieved.  These lessons learned are then incorporated in the program templatization 
methodology to maximize future savings as reflected in Table 1 below. 
Table 1 – Potential Savings 
Task Potential Savings 
Safety Lifecycle Up to 75% 
Instrumentation and Control System Design Up to 70% 
Operations and Maintenance Up to 35% 
Total Tasks Up to 60% 
By reducing engineering effort, one also realizes a significant schedule savings.  This time 
savings can be leveraged to allow multiple SI-BMS upgrades to occur concurrently within a 
calendar year.  One will be able to remove risk from the business faster than a traditional project 
execution approach that designs each BMS as a standalone project. 
Another savings included above is implementing a procurement strategy of bulk purchase 
agreements on instrumentation and controls, where the OEMs offer deeper discounts to support 
the program.  This has been very successful around control system hardware and software and it 
also freezes the project automation scope on a known set of firmware and software versions to 
 
justify reliance automated application logic testing to reduce FAT durations.  Note construction 
savings could also be leveraged by implementing a tiger team approach to reduce construction 
efforts.  The tiger team approach would use small dedicated groups of construction staff to 
leverage learnings and increase construction efficiencies.  This approach has been excluded from 
the white paper as not every brownfield site may have enough BMS installations to garner 
significant savings.  However, this should be definitely be addressed as part of the overall SI-
BMS upgrade program considering typical construction costs and the possibility of additional 
savings.         
6. Conclusion 
With readily available database tools and technology, implementation of a Safety Instrumented 
Burner Management (SI-BMS) upgrade program across multiple brownfield sites can be 
executed using a templatization approach that could yield significant cost and schedule savings 
of up to 60% for the end user.  This can be achieved via three easy steps: 
1. Plan the SI-BMS Upgrade Program to be template centric 
2. Execute templatization with small high performing teams 
3. Save on cost and schedule while delivering a high quality consistent project 
For more information on how you can benefit from templatization contact aeSolutions at 
www.aesolns.com. 
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